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A simple but elusive insight is that resjudicata is nothing more or
less than the body of law that defines 'judgment."1 A judgment is
more than a concrete embodiment of what a court has decided. Res
judicata performs the job of delineating the real content of a judg-
ment, doing so by specifying the effects of the decision. Res judicata
dictates whether decided matters are subject to reopening, as well as
which actually undecided matters nevertheless fall within the bounds
of a judgment and so receive treatment as if decided. It thus defines
by means of fixing the boundaries of the judgment. Although res
judicata law may appear to be a jumble of rules, it essentially has this
straightforward but profound mission of defining the scope of a prior
adjudication. A version of it must apply to every judgment ever
rendered.
This one insight informs all sorts of comparative and historical
inquiries. Each legal system, from its beginnings, generates a com-
mon core of resjudicata law. "The doctrine of resjudicata is a princi-
ple of universal jurisprudence forming part of the legal systems of all
civilized nations."2 The essence of res judicata-its mission of defin-
ing judgment-is nonoptional.
* Flanagan Professor of Law, Cornell University. I would like to thank Kathleen
Tighe Sullivan, class of 2005, for her wonderful research assistance, and Robert Casad
and Benjamin Kaplan for their insightful comments. Incidentally, I was Ben Kaplan's
research assistant when he and David Shapiro were working as the original reporters
on the Restatement (Second) ofJudgments. Even then, this common-law compulsory
counterclaim rule struck me as something special, but I must confess unhappily that I
had nothing whatsoever to do with its creation.
1 See ROBERT C. CASAD & KEVIN M. CLERMONT, RESJUDICATA: A HANDBOOK ON ITS
THEORY, DOCTRINE, AND PRACTICE 3-7 (2001).
2 2 A.C. FREEMAN, A TREATISE OF THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS § 627, at 1321 (5th ed.
1925).
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The prime example of that common core of res judicata is that,
in order for any nascent judicial system to operate, a judgment must
have at least some minimal meaning (whether the judgment is liti-
gated or defaulted). If disputants could just reopen their adjudicated
disputes, there would be neither an end to litigation, nor any begin-
ning ofjudicial authority. Finality is not just an efficient policy, it is a
necessary condition for the existence of a judiciary.
Thus emerges the intuitive principle of claim preclusion that a
valid and final judgment generally precludes the defendant from later
asserting mere defenses to the claim. 3 An implicit extension of this
idea is that once a plaintiff obtains a judgment, the defendant gener-
ally cannot bring a new action to undo the judgment by reopening the
plaintiff's claim and pushing those defenses (whether or not a written
compulsory counterclaim provision appears on the books or applies
in the circumstances). This implicit barrier to collateral attack, which
some of us now call the common-law compulsory counterclaim rule
and which is the subject of this Article, may seem to occupy some ar-
cane corner of the specialty of res judicata. But it in fact is critical to
any judicial system. That is, although it is intuitive, it is also
important.
Legal systems must take such an intuition, discern its rationale,
and then formulate law. Here res judicata law gets uglier, but in dif-
ferent ways in different systems. Systems may differ (1) in how far res
judicata law reaches, 4 or merely (2) in how the lawmakers have
shaped the doctrine as a matter of form. 5 In the realm of defendant
preclusion, because it is undeniable that a judgment must somehow
cut off defenses asserted collaterally, it is only the risk of overbreadth
and the form of the doctrine that are of concern.
Before Professor Shapiro came along, legal systems imprecisely
understood the rationale of the intuitive barrier to asserting defenses
collaterally, and so often produced an overly broad and very sloppy
law. David Shapiro saw the problem with unprecedented clarity and
so, as a reporter, was able to recast the doctrine in the Restatement
3 See generally 18 CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE § 4414, at 344-48 (2d ed. 2002) (discussing the rules of "defendant
preclusion").
4 See generally Robert C. Casad, Issue Preclusion and Foreign Country Judgments:
Whose Law?, 70 IOWA L. REV. 53, 61-70 (1984) (providing a survey of the law of issue
preclusion "in several countries whose judgments are likely to be presented for recog-
nition in American courts").
5 See generally CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 1, at 39-45 (noting that res judi-
cata rules and exceptions reflect the struggle between the need for clear law and the
desire for its sensitive application).
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(Second) of Judgments. 6 In his common-law compulsory counter-
claim rule, he gave judgments precisely the right effect-not too
much or too little-and did so in a formulation that was simple and
clear. Springing original and full-blown from his brow sometime
around 1972, 7 the common-law compulsory counterclaim rule consti-
tutes a curious instance that proves the power of theorizing in law
restatement and reform.
I. PRE-RESTATEMENT APPROACH
The reason that the law could wait so long for Shapiro's common-
law compulsory counterclaim rule to arrive was that some other doc-
trine would usually provide the right result. Most commonly in U.S.
law, collateral estoppel would step in to prevent a losing defendant
from relitigating the plaintiffs successful judgment. Difficulty espe-
cially arose, however, when the plaintiff won judgment by default.
U.S. law still obeyed the intuition to preclude in that situation, with
most courts sticking with an explanation of the preclusion as collateral
estoppel of the defendant on some key issue supposedly decided by
6 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 22(2) (b) (1982). The Second Re-
statement is a highly significant work. It sets out the modern approach to resjudicata
in the United States. Of course, the American Law Institute's Restatements and the
country's courts interact. The Second Restatement ofJudgments tried to express and
refine the recent efforts of the federal courts and the progressive state courts. Today
those courts tend to follow the Second Restatement in further developing the doc-
trine of res judicata. As a consequence, a coherent modern law of res judicata has
become perceptible and accepted, so that the United States today enjoys a semi-codifi-
cation of most of resjudicata law, fairly uniform albeit unofficial. In fact, at one point
then Justice Rehnquist felt obliged to remind the other Justices that this Restatement
was not binding on the Supreme Court. See Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147,
164 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (concurring in "the Court's opinion on the
customary understanding that its references to... drafts or finally adopted versions of
the Restatement of Judgments are not intended to bind the Court to the views ex-
pressed therein on issues not presented by the facts of this case"). Even if not bind-
ing, the Second Restatement merits careful study because it manages to bring much
order to the field and because it has so influenced the courts. It is not perfect, but it
is unarguably a work of the highest quality.
7 The idea of the common-law compulsory counterclaim rule did not appear in
the reporters' initial submission to the ALI, Benjamin Kaplan & David L. Shapiro, A
Preliminary Survey of Judgments (Nov. 26, 1969), and they only hinted at it in RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 61.1 cmt. i(4) (Preliminary Draft No. 1, 1972).
Yet it did appear in virtually final form in Shapiro's portion of the next draft. RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 56.1 cmt. f (Preliminary Draft No. 2, 1972).
Later, Geoff Hazard took over as reporter.
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the prior court in accepting the plaintiff's claim over any possible
denial.
8
The law thus yielded the right results in such easy cases as those
(1) precluding a defendant seeking to impair the plaintiffs property
interest declared by the initial judgment,9 (2) precluding a defendant
seeking restitution for money paid pursuant to the initial judgment,10
or a fortiori (3) refusing injunctive" or declaratory 12 relief against en-
forcement of the initial judgment. Yet any approach applying collat-
eral estoppel to a default judgment will inevitably prove far too broad,
precluding lots of issues not actually litigated and determined that
should not receive preclusive effect.
13
For example, in Gates v. Preston,'4 a surgeon's default judgment
before a justice of the peace for $6.58 in medical services precluded
the patient's pending $5000 malpractice action. The New York high
court relied on collateral estoppel, explaining that
the rule also applies to a judgment by default. In such a case the
right of action (there being no denial thereof) is by implication ad-
mitted, and when there is in the answer of the defendant an express
and direct admission by him of the plaintiffs right to recover, and a
8 See 2 HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS § 622, at
949, §§ 697-698, at 1048-51, §§ 754-768, at 1142-62 (2d ed. 1902); 2 FREEMA', supra
note 2, §§ 660-664, at 1390-401, §§ 774-787, at 1646-72. New York is the jurisdiction
that provides the best illustrations. So, on the one hand, Reich v. Cochran, 45 N.E. 367
(N.Y. 1896), held that a default judgment dispossessing a lessee for nonpayment pre-
cluded a subsequent action by that defendant to cancel the lease for actually being a
usurious mortgage. But, on the other hand, Meyerhoffer v. Baker, 106 N.Y.S. 718 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1907), was a very similar case that distinguished Reich to allow the defendant
to sue for damages from fraudulent inducement to enter the valid lease. See generally
1OJACK B. WEINSTEIN ET AL., NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE: CPLR 5011.20-.21, .30-.31
(2003) ("Even if the defense was not raised at all, a finding adverse to the defendant
may preclude a subsequent suit if the original judgment inferentially contains, as an
essential element, a finding adverse to the original defendant.").
9 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 22 cmt. f, illus. 10, rptr. note
(1982) (relying on Moore v. Harjo, 144 F.2d 318 (10th Cir. 1944); Lynch v. Lynch, 94
N.W.2d 105 (Iowa 1959); Paulson v. Oregon Sur. & Cas. Co., 138 P. 838 (Or. 1914);
Weiser v. Kling, 57 N.Y.S. 48 (N.Y. App. Div. 1899) (alternative holding)).
10 See id. § 22 cmt. f, illus. 9, rptr. note (1982) (relying on Bank of Montreal v.
Kough, 612 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1980); Martino v. McDonald's Sys., Inc., 598 F.2d 1079
(7th Cir. 1979); Fairchild, Arabatzis & Smith, Inc. v. Prometco (Produce & Metals)
Co., 470 F. Supp. 610 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Massari v. Einsiedler, 78 A.2d 572 (N.J. 1951);
Middlesex Concrete Prods. & Excavating Corp. v. Borough of Carteret, 113 A.2d 821
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1955)).
11 See, e.g., Aerojet-General Corp. v. Askew, 511 F.2d 710, 718-20 (5th Cir. 1975).
12 See, e.g., ACLU Found. v. Barr, 952 F.2d 457, 465 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
13 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 cmt. e (1982).
14 41 N.Y. 113 (1869).
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consent to the entry of a judgment for a certain amount, it is an
admission on the record of all the facts which the plaintiff would
have been bound to prove on a denial of the cause of action alleged
by him in his complaint. 5
The court observed that to recover the price of medical services a doc-
tor must establish the adequate performance of the legal duty of care,
and so the malpractice action had to fail.
16
Similarly, the same court in Dunham v. Bower17 held that a canal-
carrier's judgment for freight charges against an apple-vendor pre-
cluded the defendant's later contract action for damages from a delay
in the shipment that caused freezing and destruction of the apples.
The court seemed to grasp the delicacy of the problem, but neverthe-
less followed New York's overbroad and clumsy solution:
It is sometimes difficult to draw the line between a judgment which
will operate as a bar to an action for a specified claim, and one
which leaves the claim outstanding to be enforced by a cross-action.
It depends in a great measure upon the nature of the demand liti-
gated, the relation which the claim sought to be enforced bears to
it, and the circumstances attending it. Any fact or allegation which
is expressly or impliedly involved in ajudgment, is merged in it, and
cannot again be litigated.18
Here, the court observed that the earlier judgment had established
performance except as excused, and so the damages action had to
fail.19
However, this extreme New York result, as in the malpractice
case, ran contrary to the widely accepted, and desirable, results else-
where. 20 Even in New York, there was expression of some disquiet.
Chief Judge Cardozo, in Schuylkill Fuel Corp. v. B. & C. Nieberg Realty
Corp., 21 seemed to make a major advance toward recasting the
problem:
15 Id. at 115; see also Blair v. Bartlett, 75 N.Y. 150, 155-56 (N.Y. 1878) (coming to
the same result on very similar facts, reasoning that to obtain such a judgment, de-
spite default, the doctor had to offer proof to the justice of the peace that the services
were of value and hence that the judgment established the absence of malpractice).
16 Gates, 41 N.Y. at 115-16.
17 77 N.Y. 76 (N.Y. 1879).
18 Id. at 79-80.
19 Id. at 82.
20 See, e.g., Gwynn v. Wilhelm, 360 P.2d 312 (Or. 1961); RESTATEMENT OF JUDC-
MENTS § 58 cmt. b, illus. 3 (1942); 2 BLACK, supra note 8, § 769, at 1162-64; 2 FREE-
MAN, supra note 2, § 793, at 1681-85.
21 165 N.E. 456 (N.Y. 1929).
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A judgment in one action is conclusive in a later one not only as to
any matters actually litigated therein, but also as to any that might
have been so litigated, when the two causes of action have such a
measure of identity that a different judgment in the second would
destroy or impair rights or interests established by the first. It is not
conclusive, however, to the same extent when the two causes of ac-
tion are different, not in form only, but in the rights and interests
affected. The estoppel is limited in such circumstances to the point
actually determined....
Cases in this court may seem upon a hasty reading to uphold a
stricter rule. Analysis will show that the conflict is unreal. The deci-
sive test is this, whether the substance of the rights or interests estab-
lished in the first action will be destroyed or impaired by the
prosecution of the second. An estoppel is not avoided in such cir-
cumstances by mere differences of form between the one action
and the other. Thus, in Reich v. Cochran 22 an order in summary
proceedings awarding possession to a landlord for nonpayment of
rent was held to bar a suit in equity to declare the lease a mortgage
and avoid it on the ground of usury. The relief decreed by the or-
der, the award of possession to one adjudged to be a landlord,
would have been nullified altogether, if the same person might
thereafter have been declared to be no landlord, but a mortgagee,
wrongfully in possession under an agreement void in its inception.
So in Blair v. Bartlett23 the same professional services were the sub-
ject of the two actions, the first by the physician to recover their
value, in which action value was adjudged, and the second by the
patient to recover damages on the ground that they were without
value and harmful.
24
But the advance was what was unreal. By approving Blair's malprac-
tice result, Chief Judge Cardozo proved that he was still thinking in
terms of issue preclusion from a default judgment. Then, oddly, in
the case before him, he allowed the later action to rescind a contract
for mutual mistake, after an earlier litigated case had awarded judg-
ment on the contract.
2 5
What were the other sages saying about this subject at the time?
Unanimity did not prevail. On the one hand, although Professor Ves-
tal disapproved the most extreme New York precedent, he retreated
from it only slightly; he too addressed the problem by applying issue
preclusion to a default judgment, unless the default was not in the
22 49 N.E. 367 (N.Y. 1896); see also discussion supra note 8.
23 75 N.Y. 150 (N.Y. 1878); see also discussion supra note 15.
24 Schuylkill, 165 N.E. at 457-58 (citations omitted).
25 Id. at 458-59.
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nature of a deliberate admission. 26 On the other hand, Professor Mil-
lar, as part of his proposal generally to apply res judicata only to a
judgment's "conclusion" and not to its "premises," had sharply re-
jected the New York precedent; he looked abroad for his narrow ap-
proach, observing with approval that "the Roman principle operated
to bar a new action upon the same demand, and probably, also, it was
this principle that precluded an unsuccessful defendant from contro-
verting by a new action the right thus adjudicated."
27
The First Restatement of Judgments less radically avoided the
overbreadth of the New York approach by adopting the actually-liti-
gated-and-determined requirement for issue preclusion;28 but it seem-
ingly instructed that a default judgment cut off defenses only as
defenses:
Where the plaintiff brings an action upon the judgment, the defen-
dant cannot collaterally attack the judgment. The defendant can-
not avail himself of defenses which he might have interposed in the
original action. It is immaterial whether he did in fact interpose
such defenses in the original action or whether he failed to do so.
An action can be maintained upon the judgment even though the
defendant defaulted in the original action .... In an action on the
judgment the defendant may .. . interpose a counterclaim. It is
immaterial that he might have interposed a counterclaim in the
original action if he did not do so, except where by statute compul-
sory counterclaim is provided for.
29
ProfessorJames approved the First Restatement's approach to the
problem, but he stressed that the defendant cannot use equitable de-
fenses, as distinguished from counterclaims seeking "genuinely affirm-




Onto this scene strode Shapiro. His resolution in the Second Re-
statement provides that the defendant is free to withhold a counter-
claim for assertion in a later action, unless a compulsory counterclaim
statute or rule of court states otherwise or unless the "relationship be-
26 See ALLAN D. VESTAL, RESJUDICATA/PRECLUSION 196-203 (1969).
27 Robert Wyness Millar, The Premises of the Judgment as ResJudicata in Continental
and Anglo-American Law, 39 MICH. L. REv. 238, 239 (1940).
28 See RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS §§ 68, 70 (1942).
29 Id. § 47 cmt. e (cross-referencing id. § 58); see id. § 68 cmt. e. But see id. § 66
(indicating that the defendant loses an equitable defense in a merged procedural
system).
30 See FLEMING JAMES, JR., CrVIL PROCEDURE 570 (1965).
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tween the counterclaim and the plaintiffs claim is such that successful
prosecution of the second action would nullify the initial judgment or
would impair rights established in the initial action. '3 1  The new,
quoted provision is the so-called common-law compulsory counter-
claim rule.
3 2
The evident rationale of this common-law compulsory counter-
claim rule is that claim preclusion simply must apply when the effect
31 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTs § 22 (1982). The quoted provision con-
stitutes the black-letter section 22(2) (b). Its comment (f) explains in essence:
f Special circumstances under which failure to interpose a counterclaim will operate
as a bar. Normally, in the absence of a compulsory counterclaim statute or
rule of court, the defendant has a choice as to whether or not he will pursue
his counterclaim in the action brought against him by the plaintiff. There
are occasions, however, when allowance of a subsequent action would so
plainly operate to undermine the initial judgment that the principle of final-
ity requires preclusion of such an action. This need is recognized in Subsec-
tion (2) (b).
For such an occasion to arise, it is not sufficient that the counterclaim
grow out of the same transaction or occurrence as the plaintiffs claim, nor is
it sufficient that the facts constituting a defense also form the basis of the
counterclaim. The counterclaim must be such that its successful prosecu-
tion in a subsequent action would nullify the judgment, for example, by al-
lowing the defendant to enjoin enforcement of the judgment, or to recover
on a restitution theory the amount paid pursuant to the judgment (see Illus-
tration 9), or by depriving the plaintiff in the first action of property rights
vested in him under the first judgment (see Illustration 10). Ordinarily the
conclusion that the subsequent action could not be maintained under Sub-
section (2) (b) would not be reached unless the prior action had eventuated
in a judgment for plaintiff since only in such a case would there be the
threat of nullification of the judgment or of impairment of rights to which
the Subsection is addressed.
Id. § 22 cmt. f.
32 The reporter's note to the Second Restatement's section 22, comment (f),
states:
Comment f and Illustrations 9 and 10 are new. These materials, and Subsec-
tion (2) (b) itself, represent an effort to articulate the bases in precedent and
policy for what might be termed a "common-law compulsory counterclaim
rule." It is perhaps impossible to define the scope of this concept with preci-
sion and in any event the problem is one of decreasing importance with the
growth of compulsory counterclaim statutes and rules of court. Yet there do
appear to be at least two situations where the need for such a common-law
rule is clear, and identification of those situations may afford guidance in
more difficult cases.
Id. § 22 cmt. f, rptr. note. The reporter's note goes on to discuss those two situations,
which appear as illustrations (9) and (10). See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying
text. The reporter's note closes by citing "an extremely difficult case," Statter v. Statter,
143 N.E.2d 10 (N.Y 1957); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 22 cmt. f, rptr.
note (1982); see infta notes 45-47. and accompanying text.
[VOL. 79:51752
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of the defendant's collaterally asserted defense would be to nullify the
earlier judgment for the plaintiff.33 Note first that this rule applies
whether or not a compulsory counterclaim statute or rule of court
exists. That fact explains why its very name declares it to be a com-
mon-law doctrine. Note also that the rule applies whether or not the
prior judgment was by default. The rule indeed is especially impor-
tant because it works to guarantee that even default judgments mean
something and cannot normally be undone by later litigation.
Thus, a defendant is precluded from bringing an action for a de-
claratory judgment of nonliability after the plaintiff has obtained a
judgment on the same transaction, regardless of the jurisdiction's
compulsory counterclaim provision. So also, an uncontested judg-
ment quieting title to real estate in the plaintiff precludes a later ac-
tion by the defendant to claim title based on facts existing at the time
of the earlier judgment.
Note finally that this rule is narrow, applying only when the relief
sought in the second action would inherently undo the firstjudgment.
Thus, in the absence of a compulsory counterclaim statute or rule of
court, the defendant may default in the plaintiff's personal injury ac-
tion and then bring a separate action against the plaintiff for the de-
fendant's injuries sustained in the same accident, the idea being that a
judgment for the defendant would not nullify the plaintiffs prior
judgment.34 The defendant's recovery might be logically and practi-
cally incompatible, but it does not undo the prior judgment. So also,
although a defendant purchaser of goods should be precluded from
suing for restitution in an action based on fraud in the inducement
after the plaintiff seller had obtained and executed on a default judg-
ment for the price, 35 an action by the defendant seeking damages
from the fraud should not be precluded in the absence of compulsory
counterclaim statute or rule of court. 36
The virtues of the Second Restatement's resolution are mani-
fold.37 The formulation is relatively workable. Its narrow scope of
33 See CAsAD & CLERMONT, supra note 1, at 111-12; RICHARD H. FIELD ET AL.,
MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE IN CML PROCEDURE 688-89 (8th ed. 2003); DAVID L.
SHAPIRO, CIVIL PROCEDURE: PRECLUSION IN CIVIL ACTIONS 39 (2001); 18 WRIGHT ET AL.,
supra note 3, § 4414, at 325-37 (providing case citations). The rule nevertheless goes
ignored in Lawrence B. Solum, Claim Preclusion and Res Judicata, in 18 JAMES WM.
MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 131.21 [5] (3d ed. 2003).
34 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 22 cmt. b, illus. 1 (1982).
35 See Massari v. Einsiedler, 78 A.2d 572 (N.J. 1951).
36 See Linderman Mach. Co. v. Hillenbrand Co., 127 N.E. 813 (Ind. App. 1920).
37 See generally CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 1, at 29-38 (discussing the policy
considerations animating resjudicata rules).
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preclusion avoids the costs of unnecessarily foreclosing issues and
claims that were not actually litigated and determined. Those costs lie
not only in the inefficiency of undesirably intensifying the original liti-
gation and in the inaccuracy of fictionally treating as established cer-
tain propositions that were never adjudicated, but also in the simple
unfairness to the defendant. Under the common-law compulsory
counterclaim rule, defendants get better notice of what they will lose
by default. Plaintiffs can still seek wider preclusion by an action for
declaratory judgment.
Another advantage of the new approach is that it illuminates
some mysteries in older cases, including a few of our more famous
chestnuts. Consider Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.
38
The question there was whether New York, in a judicial settlement of
accounts brought by the trustee of a common trust fund, had territo-
rial jurisdiction to cut off the nonresident and nonappearing benefi-
ciaries' rights to sue the trustee for mismanagement. How exactly
would the expected judgment cut off this right? The answer is by the
common-law compulsory counterclaim rule. If there was jurisdiction,
as the Supreme Court held,39 then notified beneficiaries could not
thereafter sue without running into the insurmountable defense of
bar, because allowing their suit would nullify the prior judgment set-
tling accounts.
An additional illustration is Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter
State Bank.40 There the prior judgment had canceled a group of Chi-
cot's bonds held by defendants, some of whom had litigated and some
had defaulted but none had challenged subject matter jurisdiction.4'
Baxter, a notified but defaulted defendant, later sued on its bonds.
Chicot pleaded res judicata. 42 How so? Chicot was implicitly relying
on the common-law compulsory counterclaim rule to bar Baxter's
suit. To avoid that rule, Baxter collaterally attacked the prior judg-
ment, as subject matter jurisdiction had apparently been lacking. The
Supreme Court ultimately rejected the collateral attack, holding that
the rendering court had had jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction.43
38 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
39 Id. at 311-13.
40 308 U.S. 371 (1940).
41 Id. at 375.
42 Id. at 373.
43 Id. at 376. Still another example of the explanatory power of the common-law
compulsory counterclaim rule lies in Horton v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 367 U.S.
348 (1961) (jurisdictional amount, then $10,000, exists where workers' compensation
insurer sues to set aside administrative award of $1050 and claims no liability, and
workman counterclaims for his full claim of $14,035). Ordinarily, counterclaims do
[VOL- 79:51754
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Consider finally Statter v. Statter,44 which the Second Restate-
ment's reporter's note termed "an extremely difficult case,"
parenthetically describing it as "husband's successful action for sepa-
ration on grounds of abandonment bars wife's subsequent action for
annulment on ground that husband had another wife living at the
time of purported marriage."4 5 The difficulty, I think, comes from a
result that seemed unfortunate. But the result flowed from New
York's extreme position of giving preclusive effect to the unlitigated
finding of a valid marriage. 46 The result would not follow from the
common-law compulsory counterclaim rule. Allowing an annulment
would not nullify the separation. Thus, the decision under the proper
rule would not be so difficult to stomach.
To be sure, Shapiro admitted in that reporter's note to not hav-
ing settled all problems in this area. 47 It is obvious that the scope of
the common-law compulsory counterclaim rule is tricky. Centrally,
what does "nullify" mean precisely? The word has an unavoidable
fuzziness that will trouble courts, 48 while both leaving defendants in
doubt about their exposure ex ante and also providing them room for
manoeuver in structuring their claims for relief ex post.
Nevertheless, the fuzziness does not deserve exaggeration. The
most distinguished commentators summarize the rule thus:
It is difficult to formulate a rule that expresses the principle sug-
gested by these cases. The underlying purpose is to protect the re-
pose that should be established by the first judgment. It remains
necessary to determine the measure of repose that should be pro-
tected. Close analysis of many more cases may well show that the
measure of repose should be affected by the course of the first case.
Different consequences may be suggested by default, settlement,
dismissal upon motion, full trial while a prior action remains pend-
ing, and so on. For the present, all that can be said with confidence
not count toward satisfying the jurisdictional amount requirement. But common-law
compulsory counterclaims like the one in Horton help to define the amount of the
main claim and so should receive consideration, not as a counterclaim but as an aid
in measuring the main claim.
44 143 N.E.2d 10 (N.Y. 1957) (6-1 decision); see discussion supra note 33.
45 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OrJUDGMENTS § 22 cmt. f, rptr. note (1982).
46 The court relied on both Gates and Schuylkill. Statter, 143 N.E.2d at 12-13; see
supra text accompanying notes 14-26.
47 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 22 cmt. f, rptr. note (1982) ("[It
is] perhaps impossible to define the scope of this concept with precision .... ).
48 See, e.g., In re lannochino, 242 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 2001) (deciding that allowing a
malpractice claim would nullify a bankruptcy judgment awarding legal fees, given the
peculiarities of bankruptcy procedure).
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is that a judgment will be protected against the most obvious as-
saults of former defendants.
49
Taking a wider view of the rule's purposes and of its genesis, however,
helps in determining its proper scope. Recall that it emerged as a
specific aspect of the broad principle whereby a valid and final judg-
ment generally precludes the defendant from later asserting mere de-
fenses to the claim. Therefore, the defendant cannot later pursue an
action that is essentially a way to defend anew against an already adju-
dicated claim. Still fuzzy, this wider view indicates at least that the
application of the rule to a judgment should not "be affected by the
course of the first case" in terms of default, dismissal, or the like.
III. POsT-RESTATEMENT APPROACH
Despite all its virtues, the common-law compulsory counterclaim
rule, tucked away in an unfrequented cul-de-sac of the Second Re-
statement, does not seem to be sweeping the country. The Weslaw
database indicates that only twenty-one cases have used the term
"common-law compulsory counterclaim" in the thirty-one years since
the rule's publication.
50
49 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 3, § 4414, at 337. Those authors implicitly raise
another difficulty, by citing with apparent approval Olmstead v. Amoco Oil Co., 725 F.2d
627 (11th Cir. 1984) (precluding defendant even though he asserted the counter-
claim in the prior action and the court dismissed it as untimely), 18 WRIGHT ET AL.,
supra note 3, § 4414, at 335 & n.22, while citing as "[tiroubling preclusion denials"
Edwards v. Ark. Power & Light Co., 683 F.2d 1149 (8th Cir. 1982) (allowing defendant
to withdraw counterclaim without prejudice), and Joseph L. v. Office ofJudicial Support,
516 F. Supp. 1345 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (abstaining while state court rendered judgment),
18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 3, § 4414, at 336 n.24. It seems, however, that Olmstead
is the more troubling precedent. Once one accepts the common-law compulsory
counterclaim rule, then one should apply all the ordinary exceptions to claim preclu-
sion, such as judicial permission to split. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS
§ 26 (1982).
50 Chitwood v. McLemore, No. 88-6203, 1990 WL 75237, at *3 (6th Cir. June 6,
1990); Rudell v. Comprehensive Accounting Corp., 802 F.2d 926, 928 (7th Cir. 1986);
Circle v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 654 F.2d 688, 691 (10th Cir. 1981); Martino v. Mc-
Donald's Sys., Inc., 598 F.2d 1079, 1083 (7th Cir. 1979) (citing RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF JUDGMENTS § 56.1(2) (b) cmt. f, rptr. note (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1973));
Fullin v. Martin, 34 F. Supp. 2d 726, 736 (E.D. Wis. 1999); R & B Group, Inc. v. BCI
Burke Co., 982 F. Supp. 549, 554 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Franklin's Sys., Inc. v. Infanti, No.
94-C-3830, 1995 WL 505930, at *3, *5 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 17, 1995); Hill-Harriss v. Gingiss
Int'l, Inc., No. 91 C 6682, 1992 WL 22705, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 5, 1992), reconsideration
granted 1992 WL 57925 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 20, 1992); USM Corp. v. SPS Techs., Inc., 102
F.R.D. 167, 171 (N.D. Ill. 1984); Hemmings v. C.I.R., 104 T.C. 221, 232 (1995);
Sengupta v. Univ. of Alaska, 21 P.3d 1240, 1252 (Alaska 2001); Andrews v. Wade & De
Young, Inc., 950 P.2d 574, 579-80 (Alaska 1997); Fairfax Say., F.S.B. v. KrisJen Ltd.
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Now, that total might not be surprisingly small, because one
would not expect many cases involving the rule to arise. After all, de-
fendants should not be flocking to waste their money on obvious as-
saults on judgments by means of resurrecting dead defenses,
especially in a way that would test the limits of the narrow scope of
preclusion blessed by the common-law compulsory counterclaim rule.
Moreover, the now widely adopted compulsory counterclaim statutes
and rules of court would dispose of most such attacks. Finally, courts
might utilize issue preclusion to handle any remaining attacks, except
those in which the prior judgment went by default.
So perhaps the common-law compulsory counterclaim rule is one
of those rules constantly invoked in planning and discussing litigation,
even though it seldom figures in ajudicial opinion. But the rule does
not appear to be in ubiquitous play, at least on any conscious level
above intuition. For one thing, the twenty-one cases are concentrated
geographically. Fifteen of them come from Wisconsin or the Seventh
Circuit.5 1 The fact that the rule appears in opinions there but not
elsewhere implies that the rule has not really caught on in the rest of
the country. For another thing, the academy is not abuzz. The
Westlaw database indicates that before this article catapulted the rule
to title status, only two law review articles had used the term in any
way. 52
P'ship, 655 A.2d 1265, 1276 (Md. 1995); Nat'l Operating, L.P. v. Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
630 N.W.2d 116, 140 (Wis. 2001); A.B.C.G. Enters., Inc. v. First Bank Southeast, N.A.,
515 N.W.2d 904, 907-08 (Wis. 1994); Estate of Burgess v. Peterson, 571 N.W.2d 432,
437 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997); Pekay Specialty Contracting, Inc. v. Madson Tiling & Exca-
vating, Inc., No. 97-2200-Fl, 1997 WL 757570, at *2 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 10, 1997);
Sommers Estates Co. v. City of New Berlin, No. 95-2024, 1996 WL 442087, at *2 (Wis.
Ct. App. Aug. 7, 1996); Roeming v. Peterson Builders, Inc., No. 95-2099-FT, 1995 WL
759997, at *5-6 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 27, 1995); Marten Transp., Ltd. v. Rural Mut. Ins.
Co., 543 N.W.2d 541, 542 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995); Green Spring Farms v. Spring Green
Farm Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 492 N.W.2d 392, 395 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992). For a fair num-
ber of additional citations to the pertinent subsection of the Second Restatement, see
the appendix volumes to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS (1982-2003).
51 See 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 3, § 4414, at 331 (noting the popularity of this
doctrine in the Seventh Circuit).
52 Barbara Ann Atwood, State Court Judgments in Federal Litigation: Mapping the Con-
tours of Full Faith and Credit, 58 IND. L.J. 59, 65 (1982) (describing the rule briefly in a
section on the general principles of preclusion); Howard M. Erichson, Interjurisdic-
tional Preclusion, 96 MICH. L. REv. 945, 978 n.172 (1998) (mentioning it once in a "but
see citation).
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Indeed, many of the courts that used to decide this sort of case
the wrong way are seemingly continuing to mishandle the problem.
53
New York courts remain completely unimpressed by the Second Re-
statement's common-law compulsory counterclaim rule, never having
even cited it. Instead, cases like Harris v. Stein54 happily cite their an-
cient precedent in allowing a doctor's default judgment for the price
of medical services to collaterally estop a patient's subsequent mal-
practice action.
55
Still, the creation of the common-law compulsory counterclaim
rule has worked some good, and with time should work a lot more.
For one thing, it has benefited the development of res judicata doc-
trine in general. Issue preclusion, as we have seen, is the vehicle that
courts will use to reach the intuitive result if they do not have the
common-law compulsory counterclaim rule in their theoretical arse-
nal. The Second Restatement's formulation of that rule has helped to
relieve this undesirable pressure on courts to extend issue preclusion
to issues that were never actually litigated and determined.56 There-
fore, academics and courts, at least outside New York, seem to be in-
creasingly less willing to neglect the actually-litigated-and-determined
requirement, which should lead to a decrease in wrongly decided
cases.57 For another thing, the common-law compulsory counterclaim
rule has undoubtedly contributed more directly to the right decision
in at least a few specific cases.
Consider Henderson v. Snider Bros.,58 which involved a prior judg-
ment of uncontested foreclosure and dollar deficiency obtained by
the seller of real estate against the buyer, followed by a fraud action
brought by buyer against seller for restitution of amounts paid. The
District of Columbia Court of Appeals first held no preclusion, capa-
bly dissecting the problem but ultimately saying, "No other rule would
be logical; barring a permissive counterclaim would, in effect, estab-
53 See, e.g., Shin v. Portals Confederation Corp., 728 A.2d 615, 624 (D.C. 1999)
(applying preclusion, with dissent citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS
§ 22(2)(b) (1982)).
54 615 N.Y.S.2d 703 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
55 The court relied on both Gates and Blair. Id. at 704-05; see supra note 15 and
accompanying text.
56 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 cmt. e, rptr. note (1982).
57 See generally CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 1, at 123-27 (discussing the actu-
ally-litigated-and-determined requirement as "[t]he defining requirement of issue
preclusion").
58 409 A.2d 1083 (D.C. 1979) (2-1 decision), rev'd en banc, 439 A.2d 481 (D.C.
1981) (6-2 decision). Both decisions allowed to proceed a quite separate claim by the
buyer for breach of fiduciary duty and misrepresentation.
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lish a compulsory counterclaim rule." 59 The American Law Institute
then promulgated the Second Restatement, which cited that opinion
with the parenthetical of "good analysis reaching probably wrong re-
sult."' 60 Next, on rehearing en banc, the court reversed its course, ap-
plying preclusion because the new
claim necessarily involves an attack on the validity of the sales price
and therefore goes to the validity of the promissory notes involved
in the foreclosure. The evidence necessary to support a judgment
for appellants in this action for damages for fraud would have suf-
ficed to establish a defense of fraud in the foreclosure action.
6 1
Its partial reliance on issue preclusion, rather than invocation of the
common-law compulsory counterclaim rule, sounds like "weak analy-
sis reaching probably right result." The court was a bit foggy on the
precise nature of the fraud claim. The majority did not cite the
Restatement.
Then along came Carey v. Neal, Cortina & Associates,62 presenting
virtually identical facts. The Illinois Appellate Court held no preclu-
sion, but only after carefully analyzing the buyers' action as one that
sought damages for fraud, but one that neither asserted any rights to
the property nor questioned liability on the note. This court quoted
and discussed at length the Second Restatement's common-law com-
pulsory counterclaim rule, concluding:
In light of the pending controversy it could be argued that they
should have defended against the foreclosure action and asserted
fraud as a means of rescinding the real estate transaction. But as
long as the pending suit is not a means by which the [prior] judg-
ment is nullified, we believe it preferable to allow the suit to pro-
ceed. Rather than rescission and restitution, plaintiffs are seeking
damages arising out of a fraudulent scheme that the [sellers] alleg-
edly perpetrated.
63
The court's analysis stands as a model of thoughtfulness and under-
standing. "Courts should carefully examine the circumstances
presented in a specific case to ensure that a party is not precluded
from litigating a claim simply because it 'might have' been raised, if
the nature of the claim is sufficiently separate from that which was
actually litigated.
'64
59 Id. at 1090.
60 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 22 cmt. f, rptr. note (1982) (promul-
gated in 1980).
61 Henderson v. Snider Bros., 439 A.2d 481, 485 (D.C. 1981) (en banc).
62 576 N.E.2d 220 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
63 Id. at 228.
64 Id.
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CONCLUSION
Professor David Shapiro introduced the law to the idea of the
common-law compulsory counterclaim rule-under which failure to
assert an available counterclaim will preclude bringing a subsequent
action thereon if granting relief would nullify the judgment in the
initial action. Although the law might initially seem a reluctant audi-
ence, his idea will end up making res judicata not only better but
more elegant.
65
65 Cf T.S. ELIOT, The Waste Land, in THE WAsTE LAND AND OTHER POEMS 55, 59
(Frank Kermode ed., Penguin Books 2003) (1922). The poem states, but with a note
of sarcasm lacking here: "It's so elegant. So intelligent."
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